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REVIEW 
Disability and the Social Contract 
Anita Silverst & Michael Ashley Steintt 
Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, 
Martha C. Nussbaum. Harvard, 2006. Pp xvii, 487. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership 
("Frontiers of Justice"), philosopher Martha Nussbaum demonstrates 
the power of her capabilities approach for political theory by propos-
ing to bring three often-disregarded groups safely within the scope of 
justice. Like animals and economically underdeveloped nations, she 
contends, people with disabilities are excluded from traditional social 
contract theory. 
In its simplest (perhaps oversimplified) form, social contract the-
ory requires recipients to reciprocate for social benefits received, for 
why would people freely enter into cooperative arrangements with 
one another if the scheme was not similarly advantageous for alli 
Specifically, why would productive people contract to cooperate with 
unproductive individuals whose inclusion in the cooperative scheme 
brings no additional resources to the common store? The implausibil-
ity of self-regarding productive people choosing nonproductive ones 
as cooperators propels the presumption that every party to the con-
tract must have the ability to make real contributions to achieving 
mutual advantage for all the parties together (p 66). This is one of the 
many theoretical and practical commonplaces that Nussbaum chal-
lenges in her illuminating critique. 
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I See generally David Boucher and Paul Kelly, eds, The Social Contract from Hobbes to 
Rawls (Routledge 1994) (collecting essays about social contract theory). 
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Historically, the disabled have been assumed to be less productive 
than other people. 2 Indeed, being unable to work is definitive of dis-
ability under the United States Social Security system.3 Further, peo-
ple with disabilities often require more resources than other people 
because they need assistance, or assistive devices, or adaptation of 
social practice to engage in some of the fundamental activities of life.· 
A standard illustration of the added expenses imposed by disability is 
the individual who must acquire a wheelchair to traverse distances 
ordinary citizens travel across easily on their legs. s With compromised 
productivity or larger than typical needs, the disabled have been por-
trayed by twentieth-century social contract theory as problematic for 
justice (for instance, in the influential account of distributive justice 
published in 1971 by John Rawls•) because as a group their contribu-
tions are thought inadequate to offset their needs.' As a result, they 
have not been sought after as cooperators. Neither their participation 
nor their perspectives, therefore, have seemed important to social con-
tract theorists in developing definitive fundamental principles and 
procedures for justice. 
2 See Deborah A. Stone, The Disabled State 22 (Temple 1984) ("The rationale behind the[] 
categories" of the socially excluded and needy "is that something inherent in the conditions they 
describe prevents people from working, no matter how strong the will to work in individual cases."). 
3 The Social Security Disability Insurance program provides benefits to a person with a 
disability "only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he 
is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot ... engage in any other kind of substantial 
gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 USC§ 423(d)(2)(A) (2000). The Supreme 
Court underscored the presumption of disability as determinative of an inability to work in 
Cleveland v Policy Management Systems Corp, 526 US 795, 807 (1999), by holding that an American 
with Disabilities Act (ADA) plaintiff had to show how a reasonable accommodation in the 
workplace would overcome the crucial aspects of the employment-related dysfunction on which 
her Social Security Disability Insurance status was based. 
4 See generally David A. Weisbach, A Welfarist Approach to Disabilities (unpublished manu-
script, Dec 2006) (proposing ways that the tax system can compensate for the greater costs gen-
erally associated with economically discernable disabilities). Three points tangential to this dis-
cussion bear noting. First, some disabled people do not require accommodations to interact socially. 
See Michael Ashley Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality, and Workers with Disabilities, 21 Berkeley J 
Empl & Labor L 314,317-20 (2000). Second, most accommodations are necessary only because of 
the manner that social convention has chosen to organize the structured environment. See Anita 
Silvers, Formal Justice, in Anita Silvers, David Wasserman, and Mary B. Mahowald, Disability, Dif-
ference, Discrimination: Perspectives on Justice in Bioethics and Public Policy 13, 73-75 (Rowman & 
Littlefield 1998). Third, the majority of accommodation costs seem negligible. See Michael Ashley 
Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53 Duke L J 79, 102-09 (2003). 
5 See Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in Sterling M. McMurrin, ed, 1 Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values 217-18 (Utah 1980) (discussing the reduced marginal utility of a "cripple"). 
6 See generally John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Belknap 1971). 
7 But see Lawrence C. Becker, Reciprocity, in Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker, 
eds, 3 The Encyclopedia of Ethics 1464, 1465 (Routledge 2d ed 2001) (stating that a fitting and 
proportional response need not be identical in kind and quantity to the original benefit or harm). 
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Both in theory and in practice, countering exclusion of those with 
disabilities requires a powerful alternative to the supposition that co-
operative endeavors, and indeed society itself, are motivated exclu-
sively or fundamentally by participants' regard for their own advan-
tage. Nussbaum begins her book with a far-reaching critique of social 
contract theory, focusing on Rawls's version. Mutually agreed-upon 
procedures, even those that are meticulously fair, are important but 
insufficient to secure justice, she says. To achieve just treatment of one 
another (across boundaries of disability, nationality, or species), we 
must be motivated by, and therefore strive to achieve, the good. While 
social contract theory is part of the seventeenth-century philosophical 
heritage that nourishes American political values, Nussbaum's appeal 
to the good has even deeper roots, drawing from Greek philosophy 
that the founding fathers also read." 
Part I of this Review sets forth Nussbaum's version of the capa-
bilities approach, and her arguments why that framework is preferable 
as a theory of justice to Rawls's version of social contract theory. Next, 
Part II describes in greater detail Nussbaum's application of the capa-
bilities approach to persons with disabilities and considers its implica-
tions. In Part III, we apply Nussbaum's capability theory to current dis-
ability law jurisprudence and assess the extent of the practical guidance 
her book offers to courts when deciding disability rights cases. 
Even if philosophers take themselves to be developing ideal 
theories of justice, a fair test of the plausibility and power of their 
views lies in how well the conceptions they devise line up with, and · 
account for, our intuitions about what counts as just treatment under 
the law. Therefore, while acknowledging that Nussbaum pursues 
Rawls's footsteps along the path of ideal theory, we believe that exam-
ining how her theory plays out in the context of real and problematic 
disability cases, and how her approach would affect jurisprudence, will 
illuminate some of its strengths and disclose some of its limitations. 
I. RAWLS IAN SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 
John Rawls holds a venerated place in American jurisprudence 
regarding state obligations to citizens. 9 According to his now-seminal 
8 See Susan Dunn, ed, Something that Will Surprise the World: The Essential Writings of the 
Founding Fathers 257 (Basic 2006) (letter from John Adams to John Taylor referencing Socrates 
and Plato). 
9 See Samuel Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Raw/sian Political Phi-
losophy 3 (Oxford 2007) ("John Rawls is widely recognized as the most significant and influen-
tial political philosopher of the twentieth century."). Rawls's influence on a broad spectrum of 
legal thinkers is evidenced by, among other things, the stature of the contributors to Symposium, 
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account of the social contract, rational parties choose mutually advan-
tageous arrangements through a process of coming to agreement 
about the fundamental principles of justice. 10 To make the prospect of 
their reaching agreement plausible, the participating parties are pre-
sumed to be roughly equivalent to each other in strength, abilities, 
intelligence, sensibilities, and status; they are also presumed to resem-
ble each other in desiring to exercise sovereignty over themselves and 
of being capable of doing so." Further, none knows all her personal 
strengths and deficits, nor her actual social and economic positioning, 
so none can say whether, as an individual, she will be helped or hin-
dered by a proposed principle. Absent information about one's own 
differences and therefore about which social arrangements will be 
most facilitative to one's own self, the most advantageous strategy for 
any one seems to be whatever will be most advantageous for each one 
alike, regardless of who one is and what one's social and economic 
position turns out to be. 
From this "original position" situated behind a "veil of igno-
rance," all parties are similarly well positioned to convince the others 
to leave the state of nature by accepting their collectively agreed-on 
ideas regarding basic tenets of justice.'2 The homogeneity of the par-
ties making these determinations induces each to take the others as 
seriously as she takes herself, so that the power of the ideas them-
selves, rather than the power of their proponents, can be said to shape 
the resulting principles that constrain the practices whereby coopera-
tors will interact. 13 Thus Rawb's account of justice is procedural in 
nature, focusing on political anc. social processes that all the parties to 
the contract perceive as being fair, with the stability of the political 
arrangements contingent on relationships wherein equally endowed 
participants who adopt just forms of decisionmaking will reciprocate 
social contributions once beyond the veil.,. 
Rawls and the Law, 72 Fordham L Rev 1381, 1382 (2004) (noting the presence of numerous 
"outstanding scholars"). 
10 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 15 (cited in note 6) ("The intuitive idea is that since 
everyone's well-being depends upon a scheme of cooperation without which no one could have a 
satisfactory life, the division of advantages should be such as to draw forth the willing coopera-
tion of everyone taking part in it, including those less well situated."). 
11 See id at 12 ("Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his 
place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the dis-
tribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like."). 
12 ld at 139. 
13 See id. 
14 See id at 86 ("[P]ure procedural justice obtains where there is no independent criterion 
for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise 
correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed."). 
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Rawls emphasized homogeneous reciprocity. Commentators con-
cerned about justice for women and for racial minorities have insisted 
over the past quarter century that social contract theory incorporating 
this feature is flawed.' 5 The thrust of their arguments is that the social 
contract model places such outliers, either individually or collectively 
as outgroup members, beyond the reach of equal justice (p 109). 
A further application of this "outlier problem" charges social 
contract theory with standing between people with disabilities and 
justice.'• The essence of this latter complaint is that social contract 
theory, understood as a process of bargaining for mutual advantage, 
cannot do justice to the disabled. Prompted by this concern, some 
scholars have proposed expansions or alterations of emphasis within 
the framework of social contract theory," for example, by urging the 
greater salience of agency,'" or by advancing an alternative account of 
cooperation that leads to a jurisprudence of trust.'• Others have ad-
vanced alternative theories to the social contract as a means of mediat-
ing the place of persons with disabilities in society. 2" Prominent among 
15 See, for example, Charles W. Mills, The Racial Contract 63-69 (Cornell 1997) (averring 
that social contract theory positions African Americans at a disadvantage where justice is con-
cerned); Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights 224 (Harvard 1991) ("Contract law 
reduces life to fairy tale .... [A]ctivity is caged in retrospective hypotheses about states of mind 
at the magic moment of contracting."); Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract 6 (Stanford 1988) 
(arguing that the model reaches only a restrictive mutuality that shapes society by privileging 
men and denying recognition to women). 
16 See, for example, Ann Cudd, Contractarianism, in Edward N. Zalta, ed, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2003), online at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/ 
entries/contractarianism (visited Sept 29, 2007) (stating that the premise that contracting parties 
must be able to contribute to the social product of interaction leaves many people, such as the 
severely disabled, "outside the realm of justice"). 
17 See, for example, Lawrence C. Becker, Reciprocity, Justice, and Disability, 116 Ethics 9, 39 
(2005) ("[M]utual advantage theories, at least, have a good deal to say about justice for the disabled."). 
18 See generally Anita Silvers, Agency and Disability, in Becker and Becker, eds, 1 Encyclo-
pedia of Ethics 39 (cited in note 7) (stating that whether individuals with disabilities can command 
their moral duties of care turns on whether social practice permits them to be perceived as mutually 
engaged with others in morally important enterprises). See generally Lawrence C. Becker, Social 
Contract, in Becker and Becker, eds, 3 Encyclopedia of Ethics 1607 (cited in note 7). 
19 See, for example, Anita Silvers and Leslie Pickering Francis, Justice through Trust: Dis-
ability and the "Outlier Problem" in Social Contract Theory, 116 Ethics 40,58-68 (2005) (discuss-
ing "contracting with trust," which "acknowledges and even foregrounds the human conditions 
of vulnerability and dependence while preserving the idea that important moral and political 
relationships between people are illuminated by the contracting model"). 
zo See, for example, Henry S. Richardson, Raw/sian Social-Contract Theory and the Se-
verely Disabled, 10 J Ethics 419, 420 (2006) (revising Rawlsian social contract theory to include 
individuals with se\·ere disabilities); Ravi A. Malhotra, Justice as Fairness in Accommodating 
Workers with Disabilities and Critical Theory: The Limitations of a Raw/sian Framework for 
Employing People with Disabilities in Canada, in Diane Pothier and Richard Devlin, eds, Critical 
Disability Theory: Essays in Philosophy, Politics, Policy, and Law 70,70 (UBC 2005) (doing the 
same for workers with disabilities). 
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these are various feminist proposals for ethics of care. 21 One of Nuss-
baum's achievements is to preserve the sensibility and promote the 
goals of care ethics as integral elements of a robust and comprehen-
sive distributive political theory. 
Nussbaum adds measurably to appraisals of social contract the-
ory by spending about half of Frontiers of Justice in a deeply thought-
ful critique of this theory, especially as developed by Rawls (p 94). In 
her view, Rawls "delivers answers that are basically right" for the is-
sues he engages (p 6). However, Rawls's scheme "cannot solve" the 
challenge of including three categories of subjects within its ambit: 
people with disabilities, people resident in the poorest nations, and 
nonhuman animals (p 3). Nussbaum argues that Rawls's social con-
tract theory is unable to encompass these three outlier categories. 22 
One of her objections to modeling justice on social contracting 
aims at the assumption that self-regarding, rather than other-regarding, 
motivation is the most plausible explanation and the most compelling 
justification for people's giving over some liberty. The relevant self-
regarding considerations on this account are those that guide rationally 
calculating individuals in shaping mutually advantageous outcomes 
(p 104). Hence, political principles and practices cannot help but be 
shaped mainly to the interests of individuals capable of representing 
themselves through the rational calculation of their own interests. They 
therefore cannot escape privileging people whose calculated coopera-
tion is believed to contribute to other people's advantage (p 66). 
A core idea in social contract theory, according to Nussbaum, is 
respect of like people for each other. Accordingly, those who cannot 
represent themselves in the contracting process will not be respected 
as parties witli full standing (p 66). Of course, the productive coopera-
tive schemes that are underwritten by the theoretical contractual 
agreement among cooperators may make provisions for individuals 
with disabilities. After all, even the most vigorous producers may be 
hampered if they must worry about support for disabled family mem-
bers or friends, so the welfare of the disabled may be of concern in 
constructing a successful cooperative scheme. But the subsidiary prin-
ciples of generous treatment for the disabled will be formulated from 
21 See, for example, Eva Feder Kittay, Love's Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and De-
pendency 117 (Routledge 1998) (introducing a public ethic of care); Eva Feder Kittay, When 
Caring is Just and Justice is Caring: JllStice and Mental Retardation, 13 Pub Culture 557, 573 
(2001) (advocating care for individuals with mental retardation "as part of a broader idea of 
reciprocal Social Cooperation"). 
22 Nussbaum addresses these inadequacies at pp 96-223 (disability), pp 224-324 (national-
ity), and pp 325--407 (species membership). 
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the perspective of the core cooperators, not from the perspectives of 
the disabled recipients who are the purported beneficiaries. 
In contrast, Nussbaum proposes a basis for justice on which the 
needs of nondisabled and disabled people are equally important, and 
responding positively to their needs is of equal political as well as 
moral value. To address the shortcomings of social contract theory and 
its resultant trio of "unsolved problems on which justice as fairness 
may fail" (p 23), Nussbaum proffers a significantly expanded account 
of her earlier versions of the capabilities approach (p 6)." Her capabil-
ity theory is a substantive alternative to the proceduralism of tradi-
tional social contract theory for understanding what obligations states 
owe disabled individuals, well-off states owe economically impover-
ished states, and humans owe some other animals (p 409). The capa-
bilities approach, as set forth in Frontiers of Justice, specifies what 
goods are fundamental to all humans' interests. Consequently, these 
resources are core human entitlements that a just society has an over-
riding obligation to provide to everyone, regardless of individuals' 
different abilities to represent themselves in shaping mutually advan-
tageous arrangements or to contribute materially to the implementa-
tion of those cooperative arrangements (p 78). 
To give substance and direction to fulfilling entitlements to capa-
bilities, Nussbaum enumerates a list of ten central capabilities that indi-
viduals require to flourish (pp 76-78). 24 These are essential, she avers, 
because being able to exercise all of them at a threshold level is a 
uniquely human mode of existence. Put another way, central capabilities 
23 Nussbaum's most comprehensive previous articulation focused on women's capabilities. 
See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Ap-
proach (Cambridge 2000). For another treatment of disability, see generally Martha C. Nuss-
baum, Capabilities and Disabilities: Justice for Mentally Disabled Citizens, 30 Phil Topics 133 
(2002). The capabilities approach was originated by Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya 
Sen. Two representative examples of his work are Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (An-
chor 1999); Amartya Sen, Development as Capability Expansion, in Keith Griffin and John 
Knight, eds, Human Development and the International Development Strategy for the 1990s 41 
(Macmillan 1990). An elaboration of the underlying differences between Nussbaum and Sen is 
provided in David A. Crocker, Functioning and Capability: The Foundations of Sen's and Nuss-
baum's Development Ethic, 20 PolitTheory 584 (1992); David Crocker, Functioning and Capabil-
ity: The Foundations of Sen's and Nussbaum's Development Ethic, Part II, in Martha C. Nussbaum 
and Jonathan Glover, eds, Women, Culture, and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities 153 
(Clarendon 1995). 
24 Respectively: life (the faculty to live one's full lifespan); bodily health (having good 
health, including reproductive ability); bodily integrity (freedom of movement and bodily sover-
eignty); senses, imagination, and thought (cognizing and expressing oneself in a "truly human" 
way); emotions (loving, grieving, and forming associations); practical reason (critical reflection 
and conscience); affiliation (self-respect, empathy, and consideration for others); other species 
(being able to co-exist with other species and the biosphere); play (the ability to enjoy recrea-
tion); and control over one's political environment (via meaningful participation) and material 
surroundings (through property ownership and holding employment). 
1622 The University of Chicago Law Review [74:1615 
are the key determinants of the quality of individuals' lives because 
they are essential to people being able to execute "universal" functions 
and so live a "truly human" existence (pp 35, 71). Thus, to be considered 
just political arrangements under Nussbaum's capabilities scheme, 
states must provide sufficient resources to enable people to be raised up 
to the basic functional levels enabled by the ten central capabilities. 25 
Further, since each capability is a separate component in her the-
ory, states ought not provide for one capability beyond the threshold 
(for instance, by creating a superlative healthcare system) at the ex-
pense of denying or limiting some or all people's (for example, deny-
ing women education or freedom of association (p 85)) reaching the 
threshold level for any other capability. States must provide resources 
to each individual to develop threshold levels of each of the ten cen-
tral capabilities to enable each to flourish in a truly dignified human 
manner (p 85). In the case of persons with disabilities, some may need 
more resources than their nondisabled peers to achieve roughly equiva-
lent capabilities as measured against species-typical threshold levels 
(pp 87-88). So differential distribution of resources, recognizing differ-
ences among people, may be needed to achieve the good equally for 
everybody. The capabilities approach endorses allotting greater re-
sources to disabled persons if relatively greater distributions are able to 
bring those individuals up to average baseline levels of capabilities, that 
is, to the thresholds for species-typical flourishing (pp 116-18). 
Nussbaum lacks faith in social contract theory's ability to gener-
ate just outcomes. Instead, she directly designates good outcomes, un-
derstood in terms of the achievement of threshold levels of capabili-
ties (p 25). Nussbaum's capabilities scheme therefore distributes re-
sources that individuals can convert into the functionings that are of 
central importance for their flourishing. Society's obligation to achieve 
these goods reaches to people unable to be parties in a contractual 
process or otherwise represent themselves effectively in developing 
principles of resource distribution (p 71). Nussbaum thus transforms 
the contemporary philosophical approach to distributive justice the-
ory from a process-focused to an outcome-focused approach. 26 
25 The requirement is based on states' desire for legitimacy. As Francis M. Deng argues, 
when states do not adequately protect their citizens, they in tum lose their moral arguments that 
sustain sovereignty. See Francis M. Deng, et a!, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Manage-
ment in Africa 33 (Brookings 1996). 
26 By determining what fundamental entitlements states owe their citizens, Nussbaum's capa-
bilities scheme diverges significantly from Sen's formulation. Sen describes capabilities as "what a 
person can, in fact, do or be," distinguishing the distribution of goods from the capability to use 
them. He acknowledges that some individuals, including disabled persons, have both fewer re-
sources and less ability to convert resources to capabilities. The result is that some persons require 
more resources than others. Hence a uniform entitlement scheme has the potential to be both 
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Finally, as an outcome-focused account of justice directed at all 
sentient beings, including those who were excluded from primary de-
cisionmaking under traditional social contract theory, her capabilities 
approach embraces all three of the "unsolved problems" disregarded 
by Rawlsian theory and seeks to correct each one's problematic 
asymmetry of power and consequent problematic distribution of re-
sources. Justice for disabled persons requires that each one be brought 
up to threshold levels of capabilities (p 75). Similarly, justice across 
national boundaries mandates that the ten capabilities be secured at 
threshold levels for "all the world's people" (p 281). Justice for other 
sentient animals diverges somewhat because by definition they cannot 
live "truly human lives" and therefore the quality of their lives does 
not depend on their reaching human threshold capabilities. Nuss-
baum's scheme would ensure that nonhuman animals live dignified 
lives as measured against their respective species-normal functional 
levels (p 326). 
II. THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH AND PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 
Although Frontiers of Justice in turn addresses each of the three 
unsolved problems of social contract theory, Nussbaum accords the 
most expansive treatment of the capabilities approach to issues re-
garding the extent of state obligations towards disabled individuals. 
For that reason, and also because United States legislative and judicial 
history is replete with illustrations of the complexities of affording equi-
table and just treatment for the disabled, this Part sets forth an additional 
exegesis of Frontiers of Justice as it pertains to people with disabilities, 
and also assesses some ramifications of Nussbaum's framework. 
Nussbaum contends that social contract theory, understood as a 
process of bargaining for mutual advantage, cannot bring justice to 
persons with disabilities because the framework does not allow their 
participation in the group of those by whom and for whom political 
principles are chosen (pp 14-15). The exclusion, she maintains, results 
from the social contract model's invoking standards of rationality, moral 
capacity, and ability to produce and thereby to engage in reciprocal co-
operation as conditions for participating in designing the principles of 
justice. Since many persons with disabilities are perceived as being un-
able to meet these three conditions, they are not included as partici-
under- and over-inclusive. Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined 31, 37, 113 (Harvard 1992). Sen has 
declined to form or support a capabilities list, believing that such a catalog would undercut democ-
ratic political discourse. He has, however, assisted in the design of the United Nations Development 
Programme's Human Development Reports, which are notable for failing, thus far, to address the 
situation of disabled persons. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Poveny and Human Functioning, in David 
B. Grusky and Ravi Kanbur, eds, Poverty and Inequality 47,47-48,61 (Stanford 2006). 
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pants in the deliberation from the original position situated behind the 
veil of ignorance from which the fundamental principles of distributive 
justice, and (derivatively) state obligations, are determined (p 16). 27 
Nussbaum suggests that social contract theory reaches this conclu-
sion by conflating the dynamics of being the subject of justice (those 
who choose just principles) and being the object of justice (those who 
benefit from just principles), and making the latter dependent on the 
former (pp 15-16). Especially problematic for social contract theory are 
people with reasoning impairments (pp 64--65). These individuals are 
precluded from being the subjects of justice, she contends, because they 
cannot participate successfully in the contracting process. As a result, 
social contract theory wrongly deprives people with developmental and 
cognitive disabilities of being objects of justice (pp 137-38). 
In contrast, Nussbaum's scheme specifies ranges of functional 
abilities that are universally valuable because fundamental to pursu-
ing basic human interests. It thereby provides an account of the good 
in terms of core human entitlements to resources that are necessary in 
view of their functional outcomes (p 78). Society serves as a trustee 
for individuals, regardless of whether they can represent their own 
interests (but especially important for those who cannot), by way of 
the list of distributive obligations to them that must be honored for 
everyone (pp 78-82). 
For individuals with physical and mental impairments, Nuss-
baum's approach mandates that to achieve moral value through po-
litical action, states should provide each person with the means 
through which to exercise each of the ten central capabilities. Because 
the crucial value for Nussbaum is bringing every individual up to spe-
cies-typical thresholds, she expressly rejects welfare metrics that assess 
individual wellbeing through broad-based economic categories, like 
per capita GNP (p 71). Such measures, which focus on the general util-
ity of wealth maximization, cannot adequately respond to the circum-
stance of every particular individual. 28 In stark contrast, the capabilities 
27 For contrary views of how social contract theory might be construed, see Lawrence C. 
Becker, Social Contract at 1607 (cited in note 18); Anita Silvers, Agency and Disability at 39 
(cited in note 18). 
28 Comparing results published in the United Nations Development Programme's annual 
Human Development Report series illustrates this point. Without fail, one can find countries 
with substantially identical per capita GNP figures whose rates of female literacy vary wildly. Yet 
one would be hard pressed to argue that the women in countries with lower individual literacy 
live well in relation to those in higher individual literacy states, despite the equivalence in aver-
age (seemingly gender neutral) GNP determinants. One also cannot determine from the aggre-
gate GNP figures how much wealth any particular woman in any given state requires to achieve 
literacy. These reports are available online at http://hdr.undp.org/reports (visited Sept 29, 2007). 
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approach requires that each and every person be treated as an end in 
herself, rather than as the instrument or agency of the ends of others. 
To illustrate how Nussbaum's capabilities approach engages dis-
ability, consider her depiction of the lives of three intellectually disabled 
children. Philosopher Eva Feder Kittay's daughter Sesha has cerebral 
palsy and is severely intellectually disabled (p 134). Jamie, the son of 
public intellectual Michael Berube, has Down Syndrome (pp 133-36). 
Nussbaum's nephew, Arthur, has Asperger and Tourette syndromes 
(p 97). As Nussbaum describes them, each has a distinct personality and 
set of needs. Sesha loves pretty dresses, dancing to music in her wheel-
chair, and returning her parents' hugs (pp 96, 134);2• Jamie is a fan of 
B.B. King, Bob Marley, and the Beatles, and has a clever wit (pp 97, 
133);'o Arthur deeply understands the theory of relativity and other sci-
entific quandaries and is politically savvy (pp 96-98, 170). 
Nussbaum believes that "[n]one of the three is likely to be eco-
nomically productive in a way that even begins to compensate society 
for the expense that it incurs in educating them" (p 128). Sesha and Ja-
mie are unlikely to achieve functions central to exercising some capa-
bilities, in particular those that involve practical reasoning (pp 94--96). 
Arthur has "few social skills" and "seems unable to learn them" (p 97). 
Yet each is endowed with a minimum level of the central capabilities 
related to emotions and play (pp 96-98, 134). And each has talents that 
can be developed and encouraged. Sesha may not attain gainful em-
ployment. However, she expresses emotions and develops affiliations 
with others (pp 96-98, 134). Jamie and Arthur are likely to be em-
ployed and to be capable of exercising many or all of the functions 
associated with citizenship (pp 98-99, 128). Nussbaum's capabilities 
scheme would distribute resources to develop these individuals' po-
tential, but only to the extent that they can reach species-typical 
threshold levels. This holds true even if the resources required by each 
are much greater than what people usually require. The expense is 
justified, on her view, because although Sesha, Jamie, and Arthur start 
off further away from the standard capabilities possessed by the ma-
jority of society, everyone deserves being brought as close as possible 
to the minimal level needed for a dignified life (pp 128-29). 
Society's obligation to bring about this kind of good extends sig-
nificant benefits to people whom classical social contract theory has 
rejected as incapable or otherwise improper to serve as parties in forg-
ing social contracts or otherwise to represent themselves. In many, if 
29 See also Kittay, Love's Labor at 154-55, 166, 172, (cited in note 21) (describing Sesha's 
preferences). 
30 See also Michael Berube, Life as We Know It: A Father, a Family, and an Exceptional 
Child 147 (Vintage 1996) (describing Jamie's preferences). 
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not in most, circumstances, Nussbaum's scheme will enable people 
with disabilities to flourish in ways and to an extent that the social 
contract model appears unable to sustain. Nevertheless, capability 
theory may not be as generous to people with disabilities as its propo-
nents might hope. 31 
Nussbaum's account of justice supports altering people by allo-
cating resources sufficient to enable them to achieve threshold capa-
bility levels, or at least the greatest capability possible if they cannot 
rise to the threshold. Although initially appealing, this value carries 
the threat of extracting high costs from recipients who otherwise 
might seem to be its beneficiaries. In principle, people are free to have 
capabilities that meet species-typical levels without exercising them. 32 
Indeed, Nussbaum is committed to preserving this liberty.33 A related 
point is that capability theory is designed to escape paternalism. 34 Yet, 
by promoting species-typicality as the standard for capabilities, Nuss-
baum's proposed value scheme could invite oppression. 
· First, those who seem irremediably, and by their very nature, to 
fall short of having standard (that is, "normal") capabilities are ripe 
for being stigmatized by reason of their failure. For a capabilities ap-
proach may in practice find it either difficult or impossible to set 
threshold standards while remaining positive or at least neutral about 
whoever cannot be brought up to these standards. 35 In general, assimi-
lation policies or strategies can be dangerous for individuals who can-
not be assimilated. 
Second, however generous society may be in allocating resources 
so that people deficient in capabilities can acquire them, recipients 
often must pay their share with hard work or pain for the acquisition. 36 
31 See generally Silvers and Francis, 116 Ethics 40 (cited in note 19); Michael Ashley Stein, 
Disability Human Rights, 95 CalL Rev 75 (2007). 
32 See Silvers and Francis, 116 Ethics at 54 (cited in note 19). 
33 Id at 54. 
34 Compare generally Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is 
Not an Oxymoron, 70 U Chi L Rev 1159 (2003) (arguing that, through exploiting bounded hu-
man rationality, it is possible to influence behavior while preserving individual choice). 
35 Thus, although Nussbaum's capabilities approach is set forth in terms of agency, social 
pressure to exercise capabilities and their associated functioning is a familiar phenomenon. Con-
sider, for example, the debate over cochlear implants. Once the technological capability exists to 
enable deaf people to access aural communication, social pressure is brought to bear on deaf 
individuals to use this technology rather than rely on sign language interpreters precisely be-
cause the species typical mode of communicating makes them better able to participate without 
being burdensome to others. 
36 Compare Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 Yale L J 769, 772 (2002). Yoshino argues that 
sexual minorities assimilate in three different ways: converting (changing their underlying iden-
tity), passing (retaining their underlying identity but masking it to observers), and covering 
(retaining and disclosing their underlying identity, but making it easy to ignore). See id. See also 
Ilan H. Meyer, Minority Stress and Mental Health in Gay Men, 36 J Health & Soc Beh 38, 39-42 
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This is the experience of individuals who have been surgically altered 
to appear more normal. Some find the result to be worth undergoing 
alteration, but many do not. 37 
Where having capabilities is identified with the good, capability-
deficient subjects' reluctance to be improved by being made more 
capable may meet with disparagement. Despite enjoying the political 
freedom to refuse interventions that increase or improve their (range 
of) functionings, capability-deficient individuals still may be blamed 
for not seizing every opportunity to advance toward that good. Al-
though capability theory is committed in principle to maintaining a 
wide scope for liberty, in practice this approach may underwrite im-
posing the pursuit of capabilities on individuals who have reasons or 
desires not to do so. Thus, although elevating all citizens to a mini-
mally adequate capability level is a very worthy ambition, making the 
achievement of such an outcome the goal of justice revives some of 
the very same risks to disabled people that capability theory's empha-
sis on human dignity is supposed to avert. 38 More generally, Nuss-
baum's capabilities scheme may not fully embrace the humanity and 
equality of those who cannot reach threshold levels of the ten central 
capabilities. This is because only those individuals who come close to 
attaining the basic essential capabilities can live a "fully human life" 
that is "worthy of human dignity" (p 181).39 
Furthermore, although the capabilities approach seeks to protect 
social interaction, it does not sufficiently ensure participatory justice 
at a level that guarantees disabled persons' meaningful contact with 
the population at large:" Nussbaum's model is concerned about par-
(1995) (describing sociological accounts of the effect that assimilation pressure has on gay men); 
James D. Woods, The Corporate Closet: The Professional Lives of Gay Men in America 74-75 
(Free Press 1993) (same). 
37 See generally Erik Parens, ed, Surgically Shaping Children: Technology, Ethics, and the 
Pursuit of Normality (Johns Hopkins 2006); Alice Domurat Dreger, Intersex in the Age of Ethics 
(University Publishing Group 1999). 
38 For illustrations of how people with disabilities are subjected to social pressure to com-
ply with medical judgments that are risky and may render them even less functional than before, 
see generally Anita Silvers, Bedside Justice: Personalizing Judgment, Preserving Impartiality, in 
Rosamond Rhodes, Margaret P. Battin, and Anita Silvers, eds, Medicine and Social Justice: Essays 
on the Distribution of Health Care 235 (Oxford 2002). 
39 In order to set a limit on who should receive state resources, the qualities of living a 
dignified human life are defined by a list of central capabilities. Consequently, individuals who 
fall below those markers are tragic cases and, according to Nussbaum, in that respect not fully 
human. Nussbaum makes this point in several places, for example on p 187 (evaluating the life of 
Sesha Kittay as someone for whom a "flourishing human life" that is "worthy of human dignity" 
is out of the question). 
40 Undergirding this notion is a prevailing normative assumption that in a just society 
everyone should have the ability, if thev so choose, to interact with and take part in general 
culture because "individuals cannot floun~h without their joining with other humans in some 
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ticipatory justice as evidenced by the inclusion of respect and nonhu-
miliation as two key values (p 77). However, it does not require that 
these be applied to people with disabilities by drawing them into the 
mainstream of social interaction. Sequestering them in "special" or 
segregated circumstances might be defended as the most effective way 
of respecting their differences and protecting them from being humili-
ated on account of their deficits. But whether doing so is just, let alone 
sufficiently safe, is not clear. In principle, isolation from the main-
stream may have inherent dangers that make disabled individuals pro-
spectively more vulnerable to abuse, for their being distanced from 
other people may make the general population less inclined to think 
of them as human and for that reason be protective of them. 
III. THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH AND 
DISABILITY LAW JURISPRUDENCE 
It is not surprising that one of the benefits of a theory of justice 
should be to guide us in resolving problematic or competing interpre-
tations of justice-extending law by articulating and systematizing rele-
vant moral and political intuitions. For example, scholarship around 
Rawls's Theory of Justice has been widely applied to illuminate foun-
dational legal notions." Many more cases about disability have been 
litigated in United States courts than cases about animal rights or the 
obligations of wealthier nations to poorer ones. Accordingly, this Part 
addresses the practical use of Nussbaum's capability theory for some 
issues related to disability that have arisen in American jurisprudence 
as a result of disabled people's claims for justice. It assesses Nuss-
baum's capabilities approach as an account of justice for the disabled 
by asking how some of their claims to be treated justly would fare in a 
judicial climate shaped by her theory's guidance .• , 
sorts of collective activities." Anita Silvers, People with Disabilities, in Hugh LaFollette, ed, The 
Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics 300, 318 (Oxford 2003). 
41 For two examples, see Amy L. Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, 8 Va J Soc Policy & 
L 477, 516 (2001) (developing a "welfare system motivated by overarching principles of social 
reciprocity"); Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 Fla L Rev 1, 38 
(1999) ("Whether one takes a sympathetic or an unsympathetic philosophical view of social 
contract theory, one must admit the possibility that the intellectual foundations of American law 
include social contract theory."). 
42 Jerry Mashaw has suggested that when discussing disability-related policy choices, foun-
dational issues should be eschewed in favor of pragmatic and prudential considerations. See 
Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First Principles, 31 San Diego L Rev 211, 221 (1994). We agree that 
policy discourse ought to include concrete proposals, but strongly disagree that "just" theorizing 
is inadequate. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Why Practice Needs Ethical Theory: Particu-
larism, Principle, and Bad Behavior, in Steven J. Burton, ed, The Path of the Law and its lnflu· 
ence: The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 50 (Cambridge 2000) (asserting that philosophical 
theorizing is a necessary ingredient in analyzing large systemic issues). 
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At the same time, although we focus on the parts of Frontiers of 
Justice relevant to disability (pp 96-223), all three issues of justice left 
unresolved by the commonplaces of social contract theory are of a 
piece, at least because the main issues about justice in all three do-
mains are construed as primarily distributive. The core value inform-
ing just political arrangements and action on Nussbaum's theory is re-
alization of the good. This is understood as the widest possible distribu-
tion (at least among humankind) of all the capabilities, each to be at-
tained at least to the threshold level required for a dignified life. As a 
corollary, Nussbaum's capability theory requires the most effective dis-
tribution of resources to achieve this distribution of capabilities (p 275). 
In the domain that includes disabled people, Nussbaum addresses 
the obligation to distribute resources to these individuals in ways and 
amounts that acknowledge them as ends in themselves, deserving of 
treatment that affirms their human dignity (pp 88, 164-68). In the do-
main of nonhuman animals, she addresses the obligation to distribute 
resources to provide sentient animals with a decent species-
appropriate life (pp 351-65). In the domain of relations between na-
tions, she addresses the obligations of wealthier nations to subscribe to 
resource distribution schemes that enable citizens of poorer nations to 
enjoy at least threshold levels of flourishing (pp 316-17). Conse-
quently, we can project that some of the strengths and the weaknesses 
revealed by examining the theory's usefulness in regard to disability 
law may carry over into or relate to current or future law in one or 
both of the other areas. 
To illuminate the degree to which Nussbaum's approach can ad-
vance American disability jurisprudence by purging it of at least some 
of the deleterious assumptions she finds in social contract theory, we 
tum to the landmark Supreme Court case of Buck v Bell. 43 In Buck, the 
Court upheld the right of the "State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble 
Minded" to sterilize "mental[ly] defective[]" individuals." The policy 
was justified on the ground that it was in the best interest of both the 
Commonwealth of Virginia and the sterilized individuals-namely, that 
preventing "feeble minded" people from menacing society by procreat-
ing with other defective state-dependant individuals benefited all in-
volved." That Buck was driven by traditional social contract theory's 
demand for reciprocity is evident in Justice Holmes's reasoning: 
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call 
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it 
43 274 us 200 (1927). 
44 ld at 205 (famously concluding that "ltlhree generations of imbeciles are enough"). 
45 Id at 206. 
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could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the 
State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be. such by those 
concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompe-
tence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute 
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their im-
becility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from 
continuing their kind. 46 
The first half of this statement exemplifies why we should have 
the representation concern about excluding persons with disabilities 
from deliberations about the principles of justice. The framework in 
which Justice Holmes forms his opinion permits him to assume that 
the people called upon to sacrifice their reproductive abilities for the 
good of the state do not mind the sacrifice much. Yet this is clearly an 
unwarranted imposition of his own views on them, disregarding what 
they might actually feel and not withstanding the contrary evidence 
that one of them is represented in the litigation as bringing a com-
plaint against being required to sacrifice:7 
The second half is an instance of the reciprocity requirement 
problem. In Buck, having babies out of wedlock was attributed to 
"feeble-mindedness," branded as deviant, and blamed for social bur-
dens associated with people who are not gainfully employed. 48 Indi-
viduals stereotyped as burdening rather than contributing to society 
are expected to give up liberties accorded to everyone else. 49 That 
people with disabilities engage in socially burdensome conduct be-
cause they are defective,'o and that biologically deviant people are 
46 Id at 207. 
47 In fact, prior to Buck being heard by the Supreme Court, courts and legislatures had in 
many cases pulled back from imposing sterilization precisely because of objections from the 
presumptive sacrificees or their guardians. See Robert L. Burgdorf and Marcia Pearce Burgdorf, 
The Wicked Witch Is Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization of Handicapped Persons, 50 
Temple L Q 995, 1000--01 (1977). 
48 Although this characterization does not make it into Justice Holmes' opinion, the testi-
mony from the trial bears this out. At multiple points, witnesses testified about the social inade-
quacy of Carrie Buck's offspring, noting that her child was illegitimate. One Red Cross social 
worker who testified on behalf of the state was asked on cross examination if illegitimate chil-
dren were a sign of feeblemindedness. The reply: "No, but a feebleminded girl is much more 
likely to go wrong." Excerpts of the testimony are available online at http://law.jrank.org/pages/ 
13291/Buck-v-Bell.html (visited Sept 29, 2007). 
49 See generally Anita Silvers and Leslie P. Francis, A New Start on the Road Not Taken: 
Driving with Lane to Head off Disability-Based Denials of Rights, 23 Wash U J L & Policy 33 
(2007) (tracing the history and predicting the future of Supreme Court jurisprudence upholding 
as constitutional state exclusion of disabled persons on the ground of inconvenience). 
so That assertion was at the heart of the Eugenics movement. See generally Edwin Black, 
War against the Weak: Eugenics and America's Campaign to Create a Master Race (Four Walls 
Eight Windows 2003). 
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obligated to compensate by accepting constraints for the sake of social 
health, are familiar biases. 51 
Buck is notable for several reasons. 52 With hindsight even the pre-
vailing party, the Commonwealth of Virginia, admits that this case was 
wrongly decided. 53 But the assumptions underlying Buck, and the 
force of Justice Holmes's view that disabled people have social debts 
that must be paid by forfeiting some capabilities, continued to pervade 
Supreme Court jurisprudence for many decades, with deleterious 
ramifications. 54 Buck can therefore serve as a benchmark against 
which to test the comparative adequacy of Nussbaum's scheme versus 
that of traditional social contract theory. 
Plainly, Nussbaum's capabilities approach would have prompted 
an opposite conclusion in Buck, one that aligns with prevailing public 
opinion today. 55 Bodily integrity and reproductive ability are among 
her ten central capabilities. 56 More trenchantly, and in direct contrast 
to the rationale underlying Buck, capability theory ascribes human 
dignity to all humans. This is regardless of their ability to articulate 
their beliefs and feelings, to strategize to achieve their personal good, 
or to contribute to other people's or society's good (p 70). Had the 
51 See generally Susan Wendell, The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophicdl Reflections on 
Disability (Routledge 1996) (describing the influence of disability-exclusive images of bodily 
norms on the social construction of disability). For arguments that disability law ought to focus 
primarily on eliminating subordination, see generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, 
Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VaL Rev 397 (2000). 
52 See, for example, Stephen A. Siegel, Justice Holmes, Buck v. Bel~ and the History of 
Equal Protection, 90 Minn L Rev 106, 107 (2005) (noting that nearly "[e]verything about Holmes's 
opinion in Buck v. Bell has been subjected to withering criticism"); Paul A. Lombardo, Taking 
Eugenics Seriously: Three Generations of??? Are Enough?, 30 Fla StU L Rev 191, 217 (2003) 
(characterizing the decision as "a moralistic, backward judgment about eugenics"). 
53 See William Branigin, Va. Apologizes to the Victims of Sterilizations, Wash Post B1 (May 
3, 2002) (quoting Virginia Governor Mark R. Warner apologizing for the state's practices on the 
seventy-fifth anniversary of Buck). 
54 Fifteen years later, in Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 541-42 (1942), the Court prohib-
ited the State of Oklahoma from sterilizing a thrice-convicted chicken thief, but took pains to 
assure that the prohibition would not be read as constraining states from sterilizing noncriminal 
disabled persons based on "biologically inheritable traits." States seem to have taken this admo-
nition to heart as they continued to sterilize people with various disabilities until as recently as 
1979. See Silvers and Francis, 23 Wash U J L & Policy at 93 (cited in note 49). 
55 Parenthetically, although we doubt a contemporary Supreme Court addressing a factual 
scenario comparable to Buck would rule in a similar manner, the Court's disability jurisprudence 
does reflect a similar outlook, namely that disabled persons incommode society and that disabil-
ity rights are not the same as those of other historically subordinated groups. See generally Sil-
vers and Francis, 23 Wash U L J & Policy 33 (cited in note 49); Michael Ashley Stein, Same 
Struggle, Same Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U Pa L Rev 579 
(2004). For our previous discussion of retrograde Supreme Court methodology, see Anita Silvers 
and Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the Supreme Court: Standing at the 
Crossroads of Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classification, 35 U Mich J L 
Reform 81, 92 (2002). 
56 See note 24. 
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Court been guided by the values and perspectives foregrounded in 
Frontiers of Justice, the Buck decision would have been much better 
aligned with the way our understanding of justice for the disabled has 
subsequently evolved. 
But what of situations that may not appear to us now as such 
clear-cut and implacable assaults on the capabilities that are basic to 
maintaining human dignity? To test how well the capabilities approach 
responds to more complex and strenuous issues of contemporary dis-
ability jurisprudence, we reference two problem cases. First, we con-
sider an instance in which a court decisively curtailed resource distri-
bution for accommodating disabled people, but subsequent democ-
ratic practice has declined to take the court's position as precedent 
and instead has embraced a more generous interpretation of justice. 
Second, we examine statutory implementation quandaries where 
courts are required to take into consideration defendants' claims that 
distributing resources to accommodate some disabled people will ad-
versely affect other individuals. In regard to such cases, we contend, 
theories of distributive justice should have something heuristic to say. 
Application of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act57 
(IDEA) is an area of disability jurisprudence in which the Court has 
established a criterion regarding resource distribution to accommo-
date children with disabilities, but both subsequent legislative reforms 
and judicial practice have veered away from imposing that standard. 
In Hendrick Hudson Central School District v Rowley/" the parents of 
a deaf child sued the local school board to provide a qualified sign-
language interpreter in all her classes.'• An excellent lip-reader, Amy 
Rowley had been provided with a hearing aid that amplified sounds 
"during certain classroom activities" and also with in-class assistance. 60 
Overall, Amy performed better than average and advanced from 
grade to grade without difficulty. However, to attain levels of learning 
commensurate with her intelligence she required in-class sign lan-
guage interpretation, for she understood only about half of what was 
said in class and therefore lacked the same opportunity as the hearing 
children to fully develop her intellectual talents."1 Writing for the Su-
preme Court, Justice Rehnquist ruled that Amy was not entitled to the 
57 20 USC§ 1400 et seq (2000 & Supp 2004). 
58 458 us 176 (1982). 
59 See id at 184. 
60 Id. A qualified sign-language interpreter was placed in Amy's kindergarten class for a 
two-week experimental period, but the interpreter had reported that Amy did not need his 
services at that time. Her individual educational program also provided that Amy should receive 
instruction from a tutor for the deaf for one hour each day and from a speech therapist for three 
hours each week. Id at 184-85. 
61 Id at 215 (White dissenting). 
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requested accommodation because the mandate of a "free appropri-
ate public education" was satisfied.•' So long as Amy performed at an 
average level, the school had satisfied its burden, for public education 
did not require the state to maximize the potential of every child with 
a disability commensurate with opportunities provided to children 
without disabilities. 63 
In this circumstance, Nussbaum's capabilities approach appears 
to reach the same result as announced by the Rowley Court, and in-
deed might reinforce that decision. According to her scheme, the 
state's obligation is to distribute resources enabling each person to 
attain the threshold human capability level, a functional stage Amy 
Rowley undoubtedly attained or exceeded using a hearing aid and in-
class assistance. The Court would not allocate additional resources to 
give Amy (or other deaf children) the opportunity to exceed average 
achievement by more fully developing their talents, even though this is 
an opportunity their hearing classmates are given and often realize 
(and even if developing their above-average intellectual powers does 
no more than compensate for the sensory functionality they cannot 
fully attain). Nor apparently would Nussbaum do so, unless resources 
are so plentiful that there is a surplus after all people who can attain 
threshold levels of all the capabilities. Hence, Nussbaum's scheme ap-
pears materially equivalent to Supreme Court jurisprudence, in that 
neither provides that disabled children be provided the same level of 
opportunity to acquire for themselves the information and skills 
taught in public schools as nondisabled children are given. 
This is because Nussbaum's capability theory locates justice in 
the outcomes of, rather than in the procedures for, resource distribu-
tion, and specifically in equality of basic outcomes rather than in 
equality of full access. On this approach, minimum outcomes that are 
the same for everyone become benchmarks for equality. Nussbaum's 
strategy is to identify the basic necessities for dignified human flour-
ishing as the benchmarks of equality. A strength of her scheme there-
fore is to obligate the state to facilitate disabled people in arriving at 
these benchmarks regardless of whether they need more resources 
than other people to do so. The state similarly is obligated to facilitate 
everybody else in meeting the benchmarks by offering the resources 
they need to do so. Thus, the state's obligation is to ensure that every-
one equally reaches the benchmarks, regardless of whether some peo-
62 Id at 203 (majority). 
63 Id at 189-90 ("Certainly the language of the statute contains no requirement like the one 
imposed by lower courts-that States maximize the potential of handicapped children commensu-
rate with the opportunity provided to other children.") (quotation marks omitted). 
1634 The University of Chicago Law Review [74:1615 
ple require more resources than others to do so, and of whether those 
who need more resources burden those who do not. 
A weakness of the capabilities scheme, however, is the absence of 
obligation to level the playing field for disabled people so their oppor-
tunities to exceed basic outcome benchmarks equal those of nondis-
abled people ... Without equality of opportunity, disabled and nondis-
abled children of similar intellectual talents and dispositions are 
unlikely to be equal in their ultimate educational achievements. 65 While 
such disparate outcomes might be acceptable if solely due to differ-
ences of individual talent, a system where the state creates differential 
outcomes by privileging one kind of child with access to instruction 
over another equally deserving kind prompts concerns about fairness. 
Given the predilection of schools for communicating information 
aurally in the classroom, and absent provision of qualified interpreters 
or captioners, a deaf child's opportunity to access classroom teaching 
will not be equal but instead .greatly inferior to a similarly-talented 
hearing child's opportunities. Inferior access likely will lead to an infe-
rior outcome, even if that outcome exceeds the basic level needed for 
dignity and flourishing. 66 Such an approach can doom disabled people, 
as a class, to inferior economic and social status. Advocates of the capa-
bilities approach likely would agree that if excess or abundant resources 
exist, the level of capability development a state is obligated to support 
64 Lawyers and philosophers may use different terminology in assessing equality; hence an 
explanatory note is warranted. Treating people the same (initially) is treating them equally (ul-
timately) only if they are similar to one another in the relevant ways. Treating people equally 
underwrites their being afforded equal opportunity. Affording equal opportunity to people who 
do not resemble each other in the relevant ways does not require, and is not always compatible 
with, equal treatment. A bone of contention in these schemes is the baselines that determine 
relevant characteristics as well as relative position in society, as is graphically the case in ongoing 
debates over affirmative action. See Silvers, Formal Justice at 127 (cited in note 4) (providing the 
example of placing two bowls of dog food, equally, atop a four-foot-high table for both a Great 
Dane and a Dachshund). 
65 Although the capabilities approach might seem to be committed to maximizing valuable 
outcomes by developing people's capabilities to the fullest extent, this is not so. Nussbaum ex-
plicitly eschews such a purely consequentialist view (pp 338-42). For Nussbaum, outcomes must 
be assigned a more limited political role in order to make room for differences in people's con-
ceptualizations of the ultimate good (p 341). Thus the idea that political obligation is informed 
by a partial conception of the good: a central content-threshold levels of the central capabili-
ties-that everyone would or should endorse. Of course, construing political obligation in terms 
of maximizing capabilities faces practical difficulties as well. Such a requirement calls for greater 
resources than bringing capabilities just to the species-typical threshold. Further, differences in 
individuals' talents could increase disparities in advantage if everyone's capabilities are maxi-
mized to the greatest possible extent. While obligating the State to enable such disparate out-
comes seems unfair, however, so does allowing the State to support some individuals but not 
others in pursuit of maximizing their capabilities. 
66 Of course, schools could equalize the situation for deaf children in other ways, for example, by 
offering all instruction to all children online in the form of text. In this case, hearing and deaf children 
would be treated identically in that the visual mode of instruction is equaiJy accessible to them. 
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in all its citizens should be raised. But this will not resolve the underlying 
difficulty because the state still will give nondisabled students greater 
opportunity to maximize their potential, and therefore greater potential 
status and success, than disabled students, who still will be deficient in 
opportunity to achieve a better than average educational result. 
The district court in Rowley specifically opted for equality of op-
portunity, taking the state to be required to offer this child "an oppor-
tunity to achieve ... full potential commensurate with the opportunity 
provided to other children" despite her deafness."' But the Supreme 
Court found no such obligation for equality of opportunity in the 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act68 (EAHCA), the prede-
cessor of the IDEA. Practice subsequent to Rowley, however, has 
taken a progressive approach to the issue of fair opportunity for talent 
development. As part of IDEA-mandated individualized education 
plans for disabled children, lower courts will at times provide suffi-
cient funds to enable these children to develop their talents as the 
education system enables nondisabled children to develop theirs. 69 
Thus, in Hall v Vance County Board of Education'o the Fourth Circuit 
acknowledged that while minimal outcomes (like passing from grade 
to grade) might be expected for "the most severely handicapped chil-
dren," the provision for individualized education plans meant that 
minimal results "would be insufficient" for most other children." Writ-
ing eight years after Rowley, Mark Weber pointed out how other 
courts had achieved similar results by upholding the mainstreaming 
duty explicitly imposed in the EAHCA and its successors, as opposed 
67 Rowley v Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, 483 F 
Supp 528, 534 (SDNY 1980). 
68 Pub L No 94-142,89 Stat 773 (1975), codified as amended at 20 USC§ 1400 et seq (2000 
& Supp 2004). 
69 The underlying legal rationale for this shift is open to dispute. Some commentators 
argue that Rowley was undone by the 1997 amendment to the IDEA's preamble, see 20 USC 
§ 1400(c)(5)(A), which references meeting developmental goals "to the maximum extent possi-
ble" and thus meeting "the challenging expectations ... established for all children." For an exam-
ple of a court that agrees with this reading, see J.L. v Mercer Island School District, 2006 US Dist 
LEXIS 89492, *11 (WD Wash) (holding that as amended, the IDEA stresses self-sufficiency), 
reconsidered 2007 US Dist LEXIS 10343 (WD Wash) (reconsidering as to document identifica-
tion and attorney fees). But see Lieutenant T.B. v Warwick School Committee, 361 F3d 80,83 (1st 
Cir 2004) (holding that the amended language does not overrule Rowley). A second rationale is 
that 20 USC§ 1414(d)(3)(B)(iv) mandates that individual education plans consider the "full range 
of needs" and "opportunities." 
70 774 F2d 629 (4th Cir 1985) (holding that there were adequate grounds for determining 
that a school had failed to provide a dyslexic student with a free and appropriate public educa-
tion under the EAHCA). 
71 See id at 636. 
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to the appropriate education standard of Rowley. 12 Noting that this 
practice is "a stronger egalitarian idea than that applied in the Rowley 
opinion," Weber correctly proposed a corollary, namely, that "schools 
should affirmatively provide the services to enable handicapped children 
to prosper in settings from which they have been unlawfully barred."73 
That the weak egalitarianism of Rowley does not rise to current 
American moral and political intuitions about justice is further evi-
denced by the application of the Americans with Disabilities Act74 
(ADA) to public education. Title II of the statute, which prohibits dis-
crimination in the provision of state and local government services, is 
understood to entitle deaf students to qualified sign language inter-
preters if needed to give them meaningful access to any school pro-
gram or activity. 75 Indeed, from Amy Rowley's day, when the issue was 
whether sign language interpretation must be provided, controversy 
now has shifted to the qualifications interpreters must meet to give 
deaf children meaningful access to the subject matter of their specific 
courses of study. 76 Indeed, state legislation addressing appropriate 
qualifications for sign language interpretation in the public schools is 
not unusual,n offering more evidence of the value United States pub-
lic policy attributes to equality of opportunity,78 here instantiated as 
equality of meaningful access to the content of instruction. 79 
Rowley founders on a classic dilemma in theorizing the state's ob-
ligations under justice: should equality of opportunity, which permits 
differential outcomes responsive to differences of talent and effort, be 
prior or subsidiary to equality understood as similarity or identity of 
72 See Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act: A 
Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 UC Davis L Rev 349,390--92 (1990) ("The court 
supported its holding with the plain language of the Act."). 
73 Id at 393. 
74 Pub L No 101-336,104 Stat 327 (1990), codified at 42 USC§ 12I01 et seq (2000). 
75 For a detailed account, see the legal memorandum posted by the National Association 
of the Deaf, online at http://www.nad.org/publicschools (visited Sept 29, 2007). 
76 See generally Malicia Hitch, Educational Interpreters: Cenified or Uncenified?, 34 J L & 
Educ 161 (2005). 
77 See, for example, Utah Code Ann §§ 53A-26a-301, 53A-26a-201 (Matthew Bender 2006) 
(requiring certification by the Interpreters Certification Board in order to provide interpretive 
services); Minn Stat Ann § 122A.31 (West 2000 & Supp 2007) (imposing certification and train-
ing requirements on interpreters). 
78 Ironically, the Supreme Court recognized this point while under the stewardship of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist (who had written the majority opinion in Rowley) when it held in Cleve-
land v Policy Management Systems Corp, 526 US 795,801 (1999), that "[t]he ADA seeks to elimi-
nate unwarranted discrimination against disabled individuals in order both to guarantee those 
individuals equal opportunity and to provide the Nation with the benefit of their consequently 
increased productivity." 
79 For a critique of the ADA on the ground that it does not reach equality of opportunity 
in many contexts, see generally Michael Ashley Stein and Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability 
Civil Rights, 58 Hastings L J 1203 (2007). 
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basic outcomes? In Rowley the Supreme Court opted for the latter, 
but subsequent public policy and practice appear to have gone the 
other way. Nussbaum's capability theory, as applied to the disabled in 
Frontiers of Justice, does not appear to account for, align with, or sup-
port the progressive jurisprudence and statutes that disregard or de-
part from Rowley by attending to equality of opportunity, and thereby 
to fair treatment, for children with disabilities. In regard to education, 
her theory does not seem to add anything to disabled children's flour-
ishing beyond resources to achieve very basic outcomes and could re-
sult in lower distributions (as Rowley decrees) than existing practice.80 
The Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead v L. C."' raises a prag-
matic quandary for courts implementing the ADA's unambiguous 
statutory mandate of disability-based social inclusion. 82 In Olmstead, 
institutionalized individuals with "mental disabilities" claimed that the 
State of Georgia violated their rights under the ADA by failing to 
place them into community-based programs for which they were 
deemed eligible."3 In what has been perhaps overly-optimistically 
lauded as a substantial victory on behalf of disabled persons,.. the 
Court ruled that disabled persons were entitled to receive treatment in 
conditions that enable them to reside in "the most integrated setting.""' 
At the same time, however, the Court made clear that this right is 
not absolute. When determining appropriate conditions-that is, those 
that do not exceed the ADA's requirement to accommodate disability by 
causing a fundamental alteration in provided services-states may take 
into account the economic impact of moving individuals to community-
based homes. 86 For example, states can consider whether deploying the 
80 Nussbaum's sentiment undoubtedly is otherwise. She begins (p 155) and ends (pp 222-23) 
Chapter 3 with a commitment to enabling all children to reach their full human potential, which 
she takes to be motivated by "our attachment to justice and our love of others, our sense that our 
lives are entwined with theirs, and that we share ends with them" (p 222). Here, however, at-
tachment to justice and love of others appear to be distinct rather than merged motivations. 
Tracing a commitment to developing potential fully in all children to this elucidation of love of 
others seems unexceptional, but it is much harder to find the source of such a commitment in her 
account of distributive justice. 
81 527 us 581 (1999). 
82 See Stein, 95 CalL Rev at 102-04 (cited in note 31) (discussing notions of"participatory 
justice"). 
83 527 US at 593. 
84 See, for example, Linda Greenhouse, States Limited on Institutionalization, NY Times 
A16 (June 23, 1999) (reporting the decision as "a substantial victory for a disabilities rights 
movement that has looked to the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 as a tool for breaking 
down institutional walls that separate people with serious mental and physical problems from 
the larger community"). 
85 Olmstead, 527 US at 592, citing 28 CFR § 35.130(d) (1998). 
86 For a stringent critique of the Rehnquist Court's use of economic "rationality" as a 
ground for determining civil rights, see Aviam Soifer, Disabling the ADA: Essences, Better Angles, 
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resources necessary for community-based living for some individuals 
with cognitive disabilities will deprive other individuals with cognitive 
disabilities from adequate institutional-based care. 87 In the wake of the 
Court's decision, therefore, courts have been faced with the dilemma of 
what to do when allocating resources to accommodate some disabled 
people while adversely impacting similarly disabled people, or dissimi-
larly disabled people, or even people who are not disabled. 88 
Nussbaum's capability theory does not seem to provide guidance on 
how to resolve resource allocation issues that arise from competing rights 
claims. Recall that her scheme obligates states to provide sufficient re-
sources to raise people to the basic functional levels of each of the ten 
central capabilities, including the capability of affiliation (pp 75, 80). 
Moreover, each capability is a discrete and integral component of her 
theory such that states may not deny or limit baseline-adequate distri-
bution in any one capability, even if it provides resources above the 
required threshold in another (p 85). The mandate to distribute ade-
quate means to achieve each of the ten central capabilities is, accord-
ing to Nussbaum, absolute (p 75). Nussbaum's capability theory comes 
to a standstill when faced with the prospect of having to prioritize re-
source recipients; the only response it can muster is that each of the 
ten capabilities is equally valuable. 
However, this kind of dilemma does not go away in real life just 
because obligations to everyone ought to be satisfied. A theory of jus-
tice-especially a theory that foregrounds distributive justice-should 
set or suggest principles of priority in case resources are insufficient to 
discharge all public obligations under justice. In the post-Olmstead 
world, courts are forced to consider the impact on a state's budget 
created by competing demands on available resources."• This is espe-
cially anguishing, for example, when the cost of providing some indi-
viduals with the capability of association by enabling them to be in 
integrated settings is increased by calculating the impact of the result-
and Unprincipled Neutrality Claims, 44 Wm & Mary L Rev 1285, 1295 (2003) (arguing that the 
Court "arrogated for itself untethered authority to engage in second-guessing of Congress"). 
frl Olmstead, 527 US at 597 ("In evaluating a State's fundamental-alteration defense, the 
District Court must consider ... not only the cost of providing community-based care to the 
litigants, but also the range of services the State provides others with mental disabilities."). 
88 See, for example, Frederick L. v Department of Public Welfare of Pennsylvania, 364 F3d 
487,494-95 (3d Cir 2004) (considering budget constraints and other factors). 
89 Consider, for example, the competing claims facing the court in Townsend v Quasim, 328 
F3d 511, 520 (9th Cir 2003): 
Plaintiffs have asserted that it is cheaper on a per capita basis to provide long-term care ser-
vices to individuals in a community-based setting rather than a nursing home .... At the same 
time, even if extension of community-based long term care services to the medically needy 
were to generate greater expenses for the state's Medicaid program, it is unclear whether 
these extra costs would, in fact, compel cutbacks in services to other Medicaid recipients. 
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ing inability to make economies of scale in regard to other members 
of the class who must be institutionalized. 90 These kinds of cases are an 
interesting test of Nussbaum's theory because she treats the obliga-
tions to bring citizens to threshold capabilities as obligations to indi-
viduals who are in isolation from one another. The hard economic fact, 
however, is that states sometimes need to provide capability-elevating 
services to the entire class of individuals with a particular disability in 
order to make economies of scale and therefore may contend that 
they must deny some members threshold levels of one capability (for 
example, affiliation·) in order to offer all members of the class thresh-
old levels of a different capability (in this case, shelter92 ). 
This is a real dilemma and it is hard to see how a theory that values 
different capabilities equally can avoid exacerbating the problem. Yet 
Nussbaum's substantive account of the good does not seem to generate 
a principle for ranking or choosing among the capabilities, or their pos-
sessors. Nussbaum could say that the aggregating principle that informs 
these cases is wrong, and that the state may never defer satisfying its 
obligation to raise one individual to threshold level by invoking the 
specter of resulting shortfalls in support for other individuals, whether 
or not the others share the same disability. In principle, especially in an 
ideal world, namely one without resource constraints, we could be more 
comfortable with her approach. But in practice, a solution must be 
reached, for there is no avoiding incurring an outcome of some sort 
(whether good or bad) whenever an Olmstead-generated dilemma oc-
curs. Further, a solution that is just, or at least not unjust, should be 
reached. The capability approach to theorizing justice does not seem to 
offer resolution or guidance and may even deepen the dilemma. 
CONCLUSION 
In a review in The Nation, a publication identified with progres-
sive liberal democratic views, John Gray praises Frontiers of Justice for 
90 For example, in Pennsylvania Protection & Advocacy, Inc v Dep't of Public Welfare of 
Pennsylvania, 243 F Supp 2d 184, 191 (MD Pa 2003), the court decried a "simple comparison 
between the cost of community placement and the cost of institutional confinement" as inaccu-
rate because it would overlook unavoidable costs, such as the cost of keeping institutions open 
for residents in need of more care than community-based services could provide. 
91 Nussbaum describes affiliation as "being able to live with and toward others" (p 77). 
92 Nussbaum states that being able to have adequate shelter is a component of the capabil-
ity for bodily health (p 76). See also Lankford v Sherman, 451 F3d 496, 509 (8th Cir 2006) 
("Rather than focusing on an individual entitlement to medical services, the reasonable-
standards provision focuses on the aggregate practices of the states in establishing reasonable 
Medicaid services."); Radaszewski v Maram, 383 F3d 599, 614 (7th Cir 2004) ("A court must 
therefore take care to consider the cost of a plaintiffs care not in isolation, but in the context of 
the care it must provide to all individuals with disabilities comparable to those of the plaintiff."). 
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altering the terms of the social contract theory debate in a manner 
that enables justice theory to engage with political and legal realities.93 
If he is correct, then Nussbaum's capability theory will pass the test we 
advanced, namely, it will prove useful in sorting out real puzzles of 
political and legal interpretation that have arisen from attempts by 
Congress and the courts to do justice to disabled people. Our quick 
exploration of a few possible applications of Nussbaum's capabilities 
approach to real political and legal problems cannot do justice to the 
depth and importance of her work but does suggest areas and issues 
calling for more elucidation. 
During the decades that separate us from the Buck Court, agree-
ment about the injustice of that decision has developed in a process 
that aligns with and is usefully accounted for by Nussbaum's theory of 
justice. On the other hand, her capabilities approach to justice seems 
not to be helpful in regard to the agreement about the (in)justice of 
Rowley that has evolved in the shorter time since that decision. Nor 
does it seem sufficiently sharply decisive to cut through the knots ty-
ing up justice in Olmstead-generated dilemmas. 
Yet we caution that these last two observations are only prelimi-
nary. More than two generations elapsed before clarity about justice 
enveloped Buck. We lack sufficient distance from the latter two cases 
to know how justice for disabled people in situations like those the 
cases address eventually will come to be understood. 94 Nor can our 
brief discussion properly explore the explanations, expansions, and 
emendations to which Nussbaum's capability theory may be subject 
and through which her scheme might illuminate questions about jus-
tice emerging from Rowley, Olmstead, and other disability cases. We 
should recall that Rawls's theory of justice earned its influential posi-
tion by way of decades of examinations, interpretations and applica-
tions executed by other scholars, and revision and redaction by its au-
thor. Possessing analogous depth, power, and innovation, Nussbaum's 
theory of justice invites and will reward extrapolation like that ac-
corded Rawls's work, from the scholarly community and from its own 
author as well.95 
93 See John Gray, In Theory, The Nation 32 (June 5, 2006). 
94 As Nussbaum perspicaciously points out, theory and practice are interdependent 
(p 223). Prevailing theories of justice are one of the influences on people's lives, but how society 
eventually views these cases will affect whether or not her capabilities approach replaces classi-
cal social contract theory. 
95 For example, Rawlsian social contract theory has had a lot to say about the design of basic 
social institutions, while Nussbaum's version of the capabilities approach deserves further expan-
sion in this direction. We thank Leslie Pickering Francis for the prompt that led to this observation. 
